The Changing Trends in Pak-Afghan Relations: An Analysis of The Peace Process (2008-
2010)
Jehangir Khan1, PhD, Manzoor Ahmad2, PhD and Huma Qayum3
Assistant Professor1,2
Department of Political Science
Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan, Pakistan
MPhil Scholar3
Department of Political Science
Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan, Pakistan
(Received: Dec. 2014 & Published Online: Mar. Issue 2015)
Abstract
The Pak-Afghan relations have often been far from cordial since 1947. In mid 1990s, these relations saw a
brief thaw due to the Taliban leniency towards Islamabad. But this détente soon ended after the US/NATO
intervention in October 2001. The Northern Alliance, the bitter critic of Pakistan, took over Kabul and a
new era of estrangement started. Blame game went on and trust deficit kept on rise. The growing Indian
influence in Kabul and separatist movements in Pakistani province Baluchistan widened the gulf in PakAfghan relations. However, the situation underwent a positive change when the Afghan President
approached a peace process and the democratic setup in Islamabad responded in the same coin. The peace
process is a multifaceted process that takes into account all aspects of bilateral relationship. Mistrust
seems to be replaced with trust and understanding as peace envoy has been initiated and succeeded. The
ongoing process of peace can vanished distrust between the two adjacent neighbors. The paper will
analyze the mired relations in the past and to what extent that bleak scenario has been vanished due to
normalization process. This paper explores different step taken on both sides to make this process a
success story. It also analyzes the impacts of the process on security, stability and prosperity of the region.
The relevance and importance of this new trend in the post drawdown scenario will also be highlighted.
Keywords: Pak-Afghan Relations, Taliban, Peace Process, Mistrust, Normalization
Introduction
Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan
(Pak-Afghan Relations) have always remained far
from except during the Taliban era since 1994 till
2001. There is no denying the fact that besides
common historic, geographic and ethnographic
ties, the strained relations between the two
countries are indebted to the overarching regional
and international factors (Siddiqi, 2009). Despite
the convergence of interests in economic matters,
the divergence of political objectives and the
blame-game has kept them apart from each other.
Two main issues; Pakhtunistan 1 stunt and
1
Afghanistan vigorously raised claim to the Pashtu
speaking areas of Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa (then
NWFP) and Baluchistan province. On the claim that
the Pashtuns majority province should be included in
Afghanistan or give a third option of Pakhtunistan,
which was wholeheartedly supported by Khudai
Khidmatgars. Movement of Khan Abdul Ghaffar
Khan, popularly known as Bacha Khan on July 3,
1947 referendum. In which more than 70% voted in
favor of Pakistan. In spite of mass judgment in
referendum, a flag of ‘Pakhtunistan’ was raised on
September 2, 1947 in Kabul, alongside with Afghan
national flag. Afghanistan took over this issue on
many occasions after Pakistan’s independence from
which both countries adopted negative attitude
towards each other. Retrieved from
http://www.pashtunsforum.com/social-politicalissue/1232-pashunistan-concept-does-have-widersupport-pakhtunkhwa.html
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altogether negation of the “Durand Line
Agreement 1893”2 in the wake of 1947 have been
impeding the cordial relationship between these
two neighboring Muslim countries. The said
agreement was signed in 1893 between the then
Afghan government and the British Raj in India
before partition. But after the end of British rule
and subsequent partition of India into two
independent states – India and Pakistan, the issue
of Pakhtunistan resurfaced when the then Afghan
government reiterated its claim over the
northwestern province of Pakistan. The strained
Pak-Afghan relations contributed much to
instability in the region. The tribal territory has
never experienced political stability as it has
always been a "prickly hedge" quite unfit to serve
as the frontier area between the two states
(Qureshi, 1966).
Despite prevailing mistrust, convergence
of interests compelled the two neighboring
countries to enter into a bilateral dialogue on
different occasions. Efforts on both sides were
made to normalize the diplomatic relations
between the two countries. Leaders of other
friendly states took interest in bringing these two
countries closer to each other by playing a
mediating role (Dutta, 2009). Pakistan’s policies
towards Afghanistan were clear and unambiguous
as one of its foreign policy objective was to
establish amicable relations with all Muslim and
neighboring countries. Pakistan, being facing
severe pressure on its eastern border due to
aggressive Indian behavior, wanted to have a
peaceful western border. In other words, Pakistan
was in search of a strategic-depth against India
and that could only be provided by a friendly
Afghanistan (Siddiqi, 2009). However, the
relationship could not achieve the said objective.
Afghanistan showed more enthusiasm in
establishing cordial relations with India than
Pakistan.
2
Durand Line refers to the 2,640 km long porous
border between Pakistan and Afghanistan this
agreement signed between British Indian government
foreign security, Sir Mortimer Durand and Amir
Abdul Rehman of Afghanistan in 1893. For fixing the
limit of their respective spheres of influence as well as
improving diplomatic relations and trade. Retrieved
from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Durand_Line
On December 27, 1979, Relations took a
new turn when nearly 80,000 Soviet troops rolled
into Afghanistan on the call of the then
government in Kabul. Pakistan took it as a
blessing in disguise and invited the US and all
anti-Soviet state to joined hand with Pakistan to
put Soviet communist influence to rout. This antiSoviet drive sowed the seeds of never ending
spirals of violence that are still haunting the
whole region (Yousaf, 2012). Pakistan adopted
all measures to force the Soviet troops to vacate
Afghanistan. Since early 1980s, Pakistan had
started to pursue a ‘forward policy’ in
Afghanistan by encouraging religious parties to
seek ideological allies. It was an attempt to bring
conservative minded masses, in both the
countries, into a common defense posture against
the Soviet forces (Haqqani, 2005). The financial
and technological assistance of Arab and Western
countries respectively brought in the volunteers to
back the Afghan Jihad in order to run what is
now called Pakistan’s Afghan war (Rashid,
2009). Due to a number of factors, especially the
economic one, the Soviet Union announced
complete withdrawal from Afghanistan and hand
over the control to Dr. Najibullah, a pro-Soviet
President in Afghanistan, as part of UNsponsored Geneva Accord on April 14, 1988. Just
after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, a civil war
broke-out in Afghanistan between different
warring cliques. Burhanuddin Rabbani and his
Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Massoud were in
occupation of Kabul while Gulbuudin
Hekmatyar, chief of the Hezb-e-Islamic party and
the designated Prime Minister of Afghanistan
who belonged to Pashtun ethnic group, was
striving hard for control over Kabul (Coll, 2004).
The chaotic situation in Afghanistan gave rise to
another militant outfit that was called the Taliban
– the students of religious seminaries. Soon this
group won popular support and prominence in
Afghan society. Over a span of few months, the
Taliban checkmated the influence of all other
groups and took control of Kabul in 1996.
Besides Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates
(UAE), Pakistan extended recognition to the new
setup in Kabul while the rest of world remained
cautious in following them. The sternest Taliban
policies caused resentment at international level
while stiff resistance was put forward by the
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Northern Alliance3 in the country. (Haque, 2011).
Meanwhile A-Qaeda outfit joined hand with the
Taliban that brought bad name to the latter. The
alleged indulgence of Al-Qaeda leadership in the
horrific 9/11 incidence mounted international
pressure on the Taliban leadership to dissociate
themselves with the former and expel Al-Qaeda
chief from Afghan soil. On denying complying
with these demands, the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution No. 1333 on
December 19, 2000. Thus, Pakistan was forced to
stop illegal military assistance to the Taliban.
Pakistan acceded to the resolution passed by this
international organization (Rashid, 2008).
Pakistan tried to bring the Taliban leadership to
the table-talks with the United States but the
former was reluctant to concurrence to such a
posture (Grare, 2006). Subsequently the US
secretary of state made a telephone call to
President Musharraf and asked to comply with
the seven US demands to abandon supporting the
Taliban. The President of Pakistan gave his
consent to join the US-led War on Terror (WoT)
(Hussain, 2005). In October 2001, the US/NATO
forces launched ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’.
Within a few days, they invaded Kabul and
dislodged the Taliban regime. The new setup in
Kabul mostly comprised the Northern Alliance
leadership that was at odd with Afghanistan for
its earlier pro-Taliban policies (Siddiqi, 2009).
Soon the relations between Islamabad and
Kabul got strained due to the blame game on the
part of both the governments. Lack of political
stability, perverted law and order situation and
non-ending militancy gave rise to mistrust in
relationship (Rubin, 2006). However, in 2008,
newly elected setup in Islamabad took more steps
to bring normalcy to the tense Pak-Afghan
relations. In Afghanistan, President Karzai was
reelected in August 2009 and he positively
3
Northern Alliance was a group of factions who had
the common goal of toppling the Taliban was formally
in power in Afghanistan. This group comprised of five
factions of Mujahid fighters led by Burhanuddin
Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud, Abdul Ali
Mazari, Abdul Rashid Dostum, Ayatollah Muhammad
Asif Muhsini and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. Retrieved
from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_Northern_Allianc
e
responded to the initiative taken by Islamabad.
He not only acknowledged the role of Pakistan in
fighting against militancy but also stopped
issuing hostile statements and accusations against
Pakistan for each and every nuisance which his
country faced. In the wake of the US drawdown
plan, President Karzai understood the vitality of
the role of Pakistan in bringing the defiant
Taliban to peace talks with Karzai government
(Yousaf, 2012). He established the Afghan High
Peace Council. Pakistan’s role in the Afghan
peace process was recognized by the Afghan
leadership. The prospects of peace greatly depend
upon the cooperation among Afghanistan,
Pakistan and the United States but Pak-Afghan
relations will be of utmost importance.
In Pak-Afghan relations, the recent
process of peace can best be analyzed through the
“Prisoners Dilemma” of the game theory.
Pakistan and Afghanistan are the two players.
Their cooperation would result in win-win
situation while defection on the part on any
player may lead to no-win situation that is in no
one’s interest. But the questions are; first, what a
are their respective interests; second, what are the
points of convergence and divergence of
interests; and last, what are the patterns of
cooperation’s that maximize their benefits and
minimize the costs.
In the prevailing circumstances, both
Pakistan and Afghanistan are much concerned
with the security problems. Terrorism is the
common menace that is starring them in the face.
Their political, economic and social problems are
mostly emanating from this monstrous issue that
has troubled the whole world. All programs of
social and economic uplift have become hostage
by the growing militancy on both sides of the
Pak-Afghan border. Resultantly the social fabrics
of the afghan and Pakistani societies have been
disrupted. But, ironically, instead of coping with
this peril with collective efforts, they are engaged
in blame game that has given rise to mistrust. The
increasing Indian influence in Kabul has further
increased the trust deficit between Kabul and
Islamabad. To get their security issues resolved,
they have to mitigate the mutual distrust through
mutual dialogue and interaction. The recently
initiated peace process by the governments of
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both sides is a very positive and encouraging
move on the part of the leadership on both
countries.
In an attempt to enhance cooperation, a joint
Pak-Afghan Peace Jirga was convened in Kabul
from August 9 to 12, 2007 on the initiative of
Afghan President Karzai. This was the first
historic gathering of all political and groups
representing civil societies on both sides. it was
aimed at opening a new vista of interaction
through a broad-based dialogue process. The
inauguration session was addressed by President
Karzai and Pakistan Prime Minister Shaukat
Aziz, while the concluding session of Peace Jirga
was addressed by President of Pakistan Pervez
Musharraf and his Afghan counterpart. In the
Peace Jirga, a number of recommendations were
put forward to bring normalcy to the troublesome
bilateral relations. Thus, a major thaw in bilateral
relations was seen after a long time.
To boost economic and commercial
relationship, the Pak-Afghanistan Transit Trade
Agreement (PATTA) was signed in October
2010. This new agreement replaced the old
Afghanistan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA)
agreement of 1965. Pakistan’s provision the trade
facility to a mountainous and landlocked
Afghanistan shows the Pakistan’s desire to
cooperate. Cooperation in the field of transit trade
was there since Pakistan’s independence but the
innovative APTTA provides more trade facilities
to Afghanistan with India through Pakistan. Until
2011, Pak-Afghan transit trade carrying out with
ATTA of 1965 but old agreement of 1965 looked
outdated due to the changing ground realities.
The 21st century’s technological development and
occurrence of new problems on Pak-Afghan
border i.e. border raids; smuggling and corruption
that is estimated around 80-90% in the following
decade diverted both countries attention towards
the renewal of custom and regulations to monitor
and regularize trade (Nuri, 2012). This agreement
was activated on June 21, 2011 after the
replacement of bank guarantees with insurance
guarantees for goods carrying vehicles (Khan,
2011). Economic relations between the two
countries have long been a source of both
strength and friction. The Afghanistan Pakistan
Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) excursion,
from 1965 to 2010, disproves the misperception
that Pak-Afghan relations are full of confusion
and confrontation only. This positive side of the
relations shows that in spite of tautness the trade
relations between the two countries going
smoothly from numerous decades.
To deal with any dispute, Pak-Afghan Transit
Trade Coordination Authority (PATTCA) was
established on January 12, 2011. It set up an
arbitral tribunal for ensuring peaceful settlement
of economic and trade disputes. The APTTA is to
be reviewed after every five years and if need be
revised before the prescribed period (Nuri, 2012).
Nonetheless, it was a positive step just before
starting of the peace process between Pakistan
and Afghanistan. Pakistan extended full support
to the goals of Kabul Conference4 held on July
20, 2010. The conference was hosted by Afghan
government in Kabul and co-chaired by the
United Nations. The joint working group set up
by Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan exchanged
their views on the outcomes of the Kabul
Conference and supported the efforts. The joint
working group setup by Turkey, Afghanistan and
Pakistan, exchanged views on possible output of
Kabul Conference. All the countries and probably
Pakistan committed on one point that the military
strategy is not a workable solution to the Afghan
crisis but militants should be treated as common
4
The Kabul Conference, held in July 20, 2010 was the
first international conference to be held in Kabul
Afghanistan. The Conference was attended by 76
delegations (including 13 from international
organizations) and over 40 foreign ministers. This
conference was hosted by the government of
Afghanistan and co-chaired by the United Nation. The
Government presented an Afghan-led plan for
improving development, governance and security,
including priority programs to enhance service
delivery. Retrieved from
http://amudaryabasin.net/content/communique-kabulinternational-conference-afghanista The Kabul
Conference is a critical stepping stone in a “Kabul
Process” of transition to full Afghan leadership and
responsibility, building on previous international
commitments including the London Conference and
outreach activities of the Afghan Government (in
particular the Consultative Peace Jirga of 2-4 June
2010). Retrieved from
http://www.cevizcanprt.org/news_detail.php?no=13
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people to bring them to the negotiation table
through political strategy (World bulletin, 2012).
Pakistan’s Security Concern over Indian
Influence in Kabul
Pakistan has serious concerns over the growing
Afghan-India ties in the wake of 9/11 due to the
alleged involvement of Indian consulates in
Afghanistan in separatist movements in
Baluchistan province of Pakistan. There is no
denying the fact that Pakistan recognizes the right
of the Afghan government to develop its relations
with any country but the former has
apprehensions over the use of Afghan soil against
Pakistan (Iqbal, 2010). India has no direct
geographical proximity with Afghanistan but its
growing presence in the form of huge investment
about $1.2 billion in different infrastructure
projects and being the fifth largest donor in
Afghanistan’s reconstruction work has posed
great challenge for Pakistan’s security. According
to Pakistan, India exploits its ties with
Afghanistan as a tool of creating disorder in most
parts of Pakistan (Nuri, 2012; Grare, 2006).
Pakistan wants to minimize Indian’s presence and
restrict its increasing influence in Afghanistan.
In terms of diplomacy, it is always better to
keep intact the dialogue process through
diplomatic channels rather than chocking ways to
talks. Of course, dialogue is more effective as
well as more humanist approach than bullets
(Fergusson, 2010; p.5). Adopting the diplomatic
channels to resolve the Afghan imbroglio,
Pakistan has added strength to the peace process
(Khattak, 2012). Peace and stability in
Afghanistan is one of the objectives of Pakistan’s
foreign policy (Nuri, 2012). Pakistan will
definitely help to pave way for bringing the
insurgents to the talk table as well as to form
broad-base government in Afghanistan. In this
context, Prime Minister Gillian’s visit to
Afghanistan on April 16, 2011 was a right step in
the right direction. On this occasion, the two
countries reiterated to set up a two-tier high-level
joint commission to carry forward the
reconciliation process after the withdrawal of
United States-led International Security
Assistance Forces (ISAF) troops. Firm
determination was expressed to resolve the issue
of militancy and finding a negotiated settlement
to insurgency through mutual consultation.
To give momentum to the peace process,
Pakistan released mid ranking Taliban leaders.
The Taliban members were released with the
hope that they would contribute to the peace
process by working as a bridge between
insurgents and the Afghan government (Popalzai
& Khan, 2012). Al Jazeera's reporter Bernard
Smith, reporting from Kabul, said, “It's been seen
as an indication that Pakistanis have adopted the
idea of promoting stability here in Afghanistan.”
Ismail Qasimyar, the head of international
relations for the peace council said, “It is a
practical step in the right direction, which shows
that Pakistani authorities have opened a new
chapter for positive co-operation with
Afghanistan” (Al-Jazeera News, 2013 January 1).
Meanwhile, Pak-Army Chief Gen.
Kayani met the Afghan President Karzai along
with other officials, including ISAF Commander
Gen. Petraeus and Afghan National Army Chief
of General Staff Gen. Sher Muhammad Kirmi, on
the sidelines of the 31st Tripartite Commission
meeting in Kabul, where the two leaders
discussed the new counter-terrorism strategy for
the region. To improve the regional security
situation, Islamabad endorsed the Kabul plan of
President Karzai that proposed peacemaking with
the Taliban. The top military and diplomatic
officials of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US
Commander Gen. Petraeus attended the meeting
held in September 2010 to discuss the situation of
war and the Afghan reconciliatory plan (Times,
2010, October 8). The most important step
regarding this issue was not to accuse each other
but to settle it through negotiation and to avoid
killing of innocent people.
On 21 November 2012, Pakistan and
Afghanistan signed the 36 tripartite border
commissions in Kabul to boost the efforts of
border security. In the presence of Chief of Army
Staff (COAS) General Ashafaq Parvez Kiyani,
the Afghan Chief of General Staff (COGS)
General Karimi and ISAF Commander Lieutenant
General Carter known as the Tripartite Border
Coordination Mechanism. An agreement for both
the countries to settle the border disputes
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especially raids on civilians from both side of the
border (News, 2012, November 22). On this
occasion both countries focused on strengthening
of military to military cooperation and regional
stability (Yousaf, 2013). The Commander of US
forces in Afghanistan General Joseph F Dunford
during a visit to Pakistan, on April 1, 2013 held a
meeting with Chief of Army Staff (COAS)
General Kiyani at General Head Quarter (GHQ)
Rawalpindi. General Kiyani urged the ISAF
commander to help Pakistan to check crossborder attacks launched from inside Afghanistan
(News, 2013 April 2). To encourage the efforts of
building mutual trust and coordination at PakAfghan border, a trilateral meeting was held
among Pakistan, the US and Afghanistan military
commanders General Kiyani, General Joseph F
Dun Ford and General Sheer Mohammad Karimi
in Rawalpindi respectively (News, 2013, June 9).
Following three day talks in Kabul between
British Prime Minister David Cameron, Afghan
President Hamid Karzai and Pakistan’s Prime
Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf on July 19, 2012. In
a joint declaration, leaders of Pakistan and
Afghanistan expressed hopes that Pakistan’s
support to the Afghan peace process would
contribute to durable peace and stability in
Afghanistan. Pakistani side underlined the
determination to redouble its efforts to facilitate
direct intra-Afghan contacts and negotiations.”
Both sides emphasized the importance of peace in
Afghanistan for the regional security and
stability. On this occasion President Karzai said,
peace process was the most important goal that
we pursue to see how we could intensify the
Pakistan’s role in the Afghan peace process
(News, 2012, July 19). On July 19, 2012, another
round of bilateral talks was held in Kabul.
Following the daylong talks, both sides agreed on
to continue regular talks on Afghanistan peace
process and to carry on meetings of the two-track
Peace Commission. Prime Minister Pervez
Ashraf assured to arrange meeting between PakAfghan representatives to resume regular
meetings of the ‘two-tier’ joint commission to
seek peace with the Taliban (Yousaf, 2012).
On January 27, 2013, an Afghan
delegation, headed by the Afghan Defense
Minister General Bismallah Khan Muhammadi,
visited Pakistan was another goodwill gesture to
improve the bilateral relations. General Khan held
a meeting with Pakistan’s Army chief Gen.
Kiyani (COAS). In a press release issued by the
Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), the
Afghan Defense Minister thanked the Pakistani
authorities to release the detained Taliban
member’s and said that it will promote peace in
the region. The “Tripartite Border Standing
Operating Procedures” were also discussed. It
was about sharing border mechanisms and cooperation for the improvement of security and
defense to get help from Pakistani authorities
(News, 2013 January 29). On August 16, 2012, at
the OIC Summit at Makkah, President Zardari
expressed his concern over the Afghan issue by
saying that Pakistan, on every occasion, led the
Afghan cause because Pakistan has been
seriously affected by the unrest in Afghanistan.
President Zardari on OIC platform urged the
Muslim World to join Pakistan in appealing all
the Afghan groups to join the peace process as for
the stability of Afghanistan and the whole region
was dependent on peace in Afghanistan (The
Nation, 2012, August 17).
On May 11, 2013, general elections
brought a new government set-up in Pakistan.
The Afghan government raised the expectations
of co-operation from Sharif’s government in
Pakistan. Afghanistan was cautiously optimistic
about the role of PML (N) government to play its
role in the elusive peace and reconciliation
process (Afghanistan Daily, 2013 May, 13). On
June, 6, 2013, President Karzai made a phone call
to the newly elected Prime Minister of Pakistan
Nawaz Sharif and invited him to visit Kabul with
a hope that both the countries will continue to
work for further improvement in the bilateral
relations. Nawaz Sharif after assuming office as
Prime Minister also assured to establish better
relations with Afghanistan. The new government
in Pakistan was considering the issue more
hopefully. The PML (N) is more sympathetic
towards Pakistani and Afghani Taliban and can
assist in peace efforts in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s
commitment to support all initiatives and to
contact regional stakeholders in Afghanistan
aimed at promoting peace and stability in
Afghanistan. On Sunday July 21, 2013, a Senior
Pakistani diplomat, and special advisor on
national security and foreign affairs, Sartaj Aziz
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paid an official visit to Kabul to start high level
deliberation with President Karzai and to convey
a goodwill message from the new government to
start a new era of good relations. Mr. Aziz held
discussion with President Karzai, Afghan foreign
minister Zalmai Rassoul, the HPC Chairman
Salahuddin Rabbani and Minister of Commerce
and Industries Anwarul Haq Ahadi. Mr. Aziz
conveyed a formal invitation from Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif to the Afghan President Karzai to
visit Pakistan (News, 2013, July 20). On this
occasion Sartaj Aziz said that Pakistan is willing
to help startup long-stalled peace talks between
the Afghan government and the Taliban to try put
on to end to the more than 12-years old war in
Afghanistan. President Karzai positively
responded to the invitation and asked for setting
conditions for a high-level talks designed to mend
increasingly strained bilateral relations.
To give impetus to the peace talks with
the Taliban and to strength cooperation on
security and bilateral issues between Pakistan and
Afghanistan, the four-tier leadership of the three
countries, Afghanistan, United Kingdom (UK),
and Pakistan, met on February 3-4, 2013 in
London. A Trilateral meeting was held at
Chequers among the British Prime Minister
David Cameron, President Asif Ali Zardari,
President Hamid Karzai and high military
officials from both sides. Members of the Afghan
High Peace Council also attended the meeting.
Pakistan expressed its commitment to facilitate
the reconciliation process. It was third summit in
which Pakistan participated while first summit
had been held in July 2012 in Kabul and second
one had been held in September 2012 in New
York. A timeframe of six-months was set to find
a viable solution to the problem through joint and
coordinated efforts. The regional peace and
security was the main objective before the
participants (Piracha, 2013).
Pakistan, Afghanistan and the US (Tripartite
Core Group), the main players, met in Brussels
on April 23-24. Pakistani delegation was led by
Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashafaq
Parvez Kiyani, Jalil Abbas Jilani, Foreign
Secretary of Pakistan, and Afghanistan was
represented by President Hamid Karzai (News,
2013, April 23). The meeting was important to
diffuse mistrust, as it came against the backdrop
of some very hawkish allegations by the President
Hamid Karzai against Pakistan. It was hoped by
the US officials that Kerry’s good terms with
president Karzai would play a vital role in
achieving the desired objectives of the meeting
and tension would be diffused between these
neighboring countries (News, 2013, May 7).
There are concerns of different circles in
Pakistani society that the US drawdown from
Afghanistan will create a vacuum that can push
the country again into civil war like situation.
However, it is hoped Pakistan’s engagement to
bring the Taliban to the negotiation table will
definitely pave the way for a broad-based
government in Afghanistan. In this way, Pakistan
would also be able to overcome the growing
presence of anti-Pakistani elements in
Afghanistan. The détente between Pakistan and
Afghanistan on the plea seems part of the
strategic negotiations.
To facilitate peace talks, a five-member
delegation from Afghanistan under the
leadership of AHPC Chairman Salahuddin
Rabbani visited Pakistan from November 19- 21,
2013. The delegation exchanged gratitude during
his meeting with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
and Pakistani delegation on the assistance and
provision of channel of communication with the
Taliban leadership. Sartaj Aziz, special advisor to
Nawaz Sharif in a statement said, “The visit of
HPC delegation is part of Pakistan’s continuing
engagement with HPC for the facilitation of
peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan” (Dawn,
2013 November 22). In response to HPC
delegation visited, Pakistan set free three more
Taliban detainees on November 26, 2013 to shore
up peace and reconciliation process. Since
November 2013, Pakistan set free thirty-seven
Taliban leaders, almost all the key leaders, to
give impetus to the Afghan peace process.
Reportedly, some of the released members
rejoined the Taliban ranks (Dawn, 2013,
November 27).
On November 30, 2013 Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif during his first visit to Afghanistan
after taking oath for the third time, expresses his
views, “It is an imperative to reverse the
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destruction cycle of conflict. Pakistan will
continue to extend all possible help for the
Afghan Pace Process” In response to these views
President Karzai said, “There is no doubt that
cooperation and relations with Afghanistan have
expanded since Nawaz Sharif has taken office”
(Dawn, 2013 December 1).
Conclusion
To overcome the current volcanic eruption of
insurgency, both Pakistan and Afghanistan have a
unanimous approach to resolving the issue. As far
as the role of Pakistan in Afghanistan peace and
reconciliation is concerned, Pakistan has
supported the Afghan cause on every occasion.
Pakistan can play a vital role in resolving the
issue by using its good offices to mitigate the
differences between warring factions and the
Afghan government (Grare, 2006). Therefore,
inclusion of Pakistan in the HPC core-group
format was not only a great achievement from
Afghan side but Pakistan is also optimistic to
bring major policy shift to improve its strategic
ties. Pakistan is on ‘tenterhooks’ to play its role in
Afghanistan (Khan & Goraya (2013). “The Peace
Process Roadmap” 5 in which both countries
expressed willingness to engage in peaceful talks
was the symbol of improvement in bilateral
relations. The post-2014 scenario in Afghanistan
has been subject to most annoying debate now-adays. Now, all the political parties, especially
religious parties are prone to peace in the region.
They are of the opinion that Pakistan must play a
more constructive role so that the future setup in
5
A four page document drafted by President Karzai
and his inner circle for scripting events and future
developments between Pakistan and Afghanistan, this
roadmap based on five steps each step with its
objectives. HPC Chairman Salahuddin Rabbani during
his visit to Pakistan in November 2012 presented the
plan. Main focus was to an end to the cross border
shelling, transfer of the Taliban prisoners by Pakistan
to Afghanistan. Last but not the least through peace
process brings the insurgents to the table of direct
peace talks on the initiative of US and Pakistan ahead
of the drawdown of ISAF troops. Retrieved from
http://www.eurasiareview.com/10022013-afghanpeace-process-roadmap-to-2015-internal-securitynightmare-for-india-analysis/
Kabul is not antagonistic. Regardless of the facts,
whether the NATO forces exist in Afghanistan or
not, cordial relationship with all the stakeholders
of Afghanistan should be topmost priority for
Pakistan. No doubt, Pakistan’s security is
constituently linked with Afghanistan in multiple
ways. Both countries’ leadership is committed
that for turning the tide of conflict and instability
that has engulfed the region. To remove this
cynicism Pak-Afghan joint collaboration is
indispensable.
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